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Abstract:  
 
This paper describes how home ownership decisions of US American 
young adults may have changed with the financial crisis of 2008. 
It uses the NLSY97, a panel data set which follows individuals from their 
childhood until their early adulthood. It asks individuals who have turned 25 
years of age what their assets, earnings and home situation are. By looking 
at how these answers differ over time, and between home owners and 
renters, we assess how the 2008 crisis has impacted on the differences 
between home owners and renters. Results suggest that the earnings 
distribution of renters remained more or less constant throughout the 
period, in nominal prices, while the divide between earnings of buyers and 
renters increased. At the same time, rental costs have increased, which 
suggests that the inequality between these two groups may have increased. 
Renters also seem to have become more risk takers and try to compensate 
by having larger than usual risky assets in their portfolios.  
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1 Motivation
Home ownership allows individuals to add a very important asset and equity
to their savings, but can result in high levels of indebtedness. Before the
ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, most economic models assumed housing was the safe
or less risky asset and could be used as a hedging investment for other risky
assets, or simply income risk. Yao & Zhang (2005) presents a model of home
ownership with stochastic income, equity investments, down payment and
transaction costs in the housing market, and housing consumption derived
from either owning or renting. They ﬁnd from numerical simulations that
holding all else constant, households prefer to own rather than rent due to
the tax beneﬁts of mortgages and the moral hazard problems of renting.
Households rent when their holdings of liquid assets, stocks and bonds, are
low, and buy a house when they are no longer liquidity constrained. An
additional ﬁnding is that when households are indiﬀerent between owning
and renting, they make very diﬀerent investments when they own rather
than when they rent. Households that own a house reduce the proportion
of stock holdings in their net worth, which is made up of stocks, bonds, and
housing equity. They however hold a higher stock proportion in their liquid
portfolio of stocks and bonds than renters. This is explained by the desire to
diversify between the two risky assets, housing and stocks. The theoretical
ﬁndings are supplemented with empirical estimations using PSID data, with a
two-step kernel weighting procedure combining conditional logit regressions
with OLS to jointly account for selection into stock market participation
and individual unobserved heterogeneity. Cocco (2005) presents a similar
structural model, and argues that the positive correlation between mortgage
debt and stock holdings is explained by variation in human capital across
households. Those with more human capital buy larger houses and borrow
more to do so. These households also buy more stocks because human capital
resembles the safe asset, namely bonds or treasury bills, in terms of returns
despite being somewhat risky. These assertions are backed up by structural
estimations of the model using PSID data.
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 showed housing can be a risky asset when
expectations fail to anticipate sharp decreases in market value of houses.
Banks et al. (2010) argues that increased volatility in house prices induces
individuals to become home owners earlier, and also to ascend the hous-
ing ladder (buy a bigger house) faster. The paper presents a theoretical
discrete-time model illustrating the three main purposes of housing owner-
ship; consumption, investment, and as a hedge against future house price
volatility higher up the housing ladder. The main driver of the decision to
buy the ﬁrst house is anticipated partnering and fertility, which is modeled
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as a choice between renting and buying a property upon leaving the parental
home. The model is then used to generate predictions on the age of initial
home ownership, whether or not to reﬁnance, and the quantity of housing
wealth or number of rooms owned over the life-cycle. Probit estimations
of ownership are used to verify the results from model simulations, show-
ing that risk aversion leads individuals to buy their ﬁrst home earlier when
house prices are volatile and when expected capital gains from home owner-
ship are high. This paper however, assumes that individuals make rational
expectations about the expected value of their homes, and cannot say much
about the incentives to become a home owner when expectations are not
self-fulﬁlling. A companion study Banks et al. (2010) ﬁnds that the elderly,
already home owners, reduce their housing consumption and wealth faster in
the face of greater house price volatility, which suggest that the investment
incentive of housing becomes weaker under increased volatility, and so does
the attractiveness of holding housing wealth versus liquidity.
An important paper that acknowledges that rental markets are also risky
is Sinai & Souleles (2003). This is because renters purchase housing services
in a spot market, exposing themselves to annual ﬂuctuations in rental prices.
Home owners on the other hand buy a guaranteed stream of housing for a
known immediate price, and receive annual dividends from the house equal
to its ex-post rental price. In a simple model of tenure choice, this paper
shows that households with longer horizons choose to own homes in the
face of rental risk. This is because house price risk at the time of sale is
farther away in the future, and therefore small in present value, and also
because renting increases exposure to rental price risk over a longer time
horizon. They also ﬁnd that home ownership increases with greater house
price correlation across diﬀerent housing markets, as the sale and repurchase
prices of homes are likelier to oﬀset, which reduces housing price risk and
lengthens the households eﬀective horizon. These results are empirically
veriﬁed using data on median house prices in the US from the 1990 Census,
combined with growth rates of the Freddie-Mac repeat sales house price index
to derive annual house prices. Data on rents are taken from surveys of “Class
A” apartments by Reis, a commercial real estate company. Data on home
ownership and demographic characteristics are taken from the 1990 and 1999
Current Population Survey March Annual Demographic Supplements.
In the current context, also banks have increased barriers to home loans
by decreasing the loan-to-value ratio and making access to credit overall
more diﬃcult, forcing individuals, often ﬁrst-time buyers who cannot aﬀord
to pay or borrow a high initial down payment, out of the housing market.
ORTALO-MAGNE´ & Rady (2006) develops a lifecyle model of home owner-
ship with down payment credit constraints and a property ladder. The model
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shows that income shocks to young households that determine their ability
to aﬀord the down payment on their ﬁrst “starter” home are an important
source of housing price volatility. It also identiﬁes the capital gains channel
as important for price “overreaction” of larger trade-up homes, as households
wishing to climb the property ladder increase the demand for such homes by
trading up from starter homes that appreciate in value. This capital gains
mechanism explains the positive correlation between house prices and trans-
actions seen in the UK and US data. Yao & Zhang (2005) show how liquidity
constraints, which worsen with a higher down payment, are the main factor
delaying home ownership.
Literature has suggested that institutions, loan arrangements and tax sys-
tems can substantially impact on individual decisions to buy or rent a home.
Brueckner (1986) presents a two period model where the size of the down
payment discourages home ownership and a more progressive tax system in-
creases home ownership by allowing households to shift purchasing power
to the present when their incomes are lower and thereby spurring savings.
Ozyildirim et al. (2005) presents a discrete-time, discrete-state Markov de-
cision model of tenure choice for households that explicitly incorporates the
probability of moving in the future, and depends on mortgage rates, taxes,
transaction and rental costs, house prices, and various other factors. They
ﬁnd heterogeneous eﬀects over the life-cycle from simulations, with housing
ownership increasing more for younger households with lower market inter-
est rate-mortgage rate spread and higher income tax rate than for older
households. A greater home appreciation rate increases home ownership
of the young, but reduces that of the old. Higher transaction costs lower
home ownership across all ages, but more so for middle-aged households.
Higher rents relative to house prices leads households to become home own-
ers sooner, with steep reductions in propensity to own homes with declining
rents. Banks et al. (2010) on the other hand, conclude that higher rents can
discourage both renting and home ownership by delaying the decision to leave
the parental home. Ortalo-Magne´ & Rady (2002) presents a dynamic model
of tenure choice which treats rented and owner-occupied housing as perfect
substitutes, thus linking tenure choice explicitly to returns from non-housing
consumption. The analytical results show that households are likelier to own
homes when the covariance between incomes and rents declines, and when
households plan to spend a long period of time in the house so that they can
lock in future rents at their expected value. However, households may own
a house even when they plan to buy another one shortly as the gains from
ownership increase as the covariance between prices of all the houses that are
part of the household’s housing plan increases.
Empirical analysis of renters is often not as widespread as the empirical
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analysis of buyers because longitudinal surveys tend to underrepresent renters
who are more likely to attrite and move. However, the simultaneous analysis
of the incentives of home owners and buyers is needed to explore how added
risk and uncertainty impact on their choices and consequent income and
wealth trajectories. This paper aims to ﬁll in this gap, by looking at how
renters and buyers’ ﬁnancial health compare and changed as a consequence
of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. It uses the NLSY97, a panel data set which
follows individuals from their childhood until their early adulthood. It asks
individuals who have turned 25 years of age what their assets, earnings and
home situation is. By looking at how these answers diﬀer over time, and
between home owners and renters, we assess how the 2008 crisis has impacted
on the diﬀerences between home owners and renters. Results suggest that the
earnings distribution of renters remained more or less constant throughout
the period, in nominal prices, while the gap between earnings of buyers and
renters ﬁrst increased and then decreased during the crisis. At the same time,
rental costs have increased, which suggests that the inequality between these
two groups has increased.
The next section describes the NLSY97 and the sample used in this paper
while section 3 shows the diﬀerence in indicators of ﬁnancial health between
renters and buyers, and how this diﬀerence has evolved with the presence of
the crisis in 2008. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
Analysing home ownership decisions requires good data both on homeowners
and on those who are renting. Most panel data sets underrepresent the
sample of those renting due to the higher chances these individuals attrite
between sample years. The NLSY97 samples individuals who were in their
early adulthood years when the ﬁnancial crisis broke out. This panel data set
is nationally representative of the cohorts who were 12 to 16 years old as of
December 31, 1996. By 2008, this means our sample was aged between 23 and
28. Round 1 of the survey took place in 1997. In that round, both parents
and youth were interviewed and demographic information collected on young
adults, on who they live with and their immediate family living elsewhere
(e.g. if parents divorced, those living with the young adult, whether biological
or step-parents would be interviewed, and so would biological parents living
elsewhere). Youths are interviewed on an annual basis. Last round used is
2009, the last round available at time.
The NLSY97 is designed to document the transition from school to work
and into adulthood. It collects extensive information about youths’ labor
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market behavior and educational outcomes. It also includes detailed infor-
mation about topics which tend to aﬀect young people’s outcomes, such as
their relationships with parents, contact with absent parents, marital and
fertility histories, dating, sexual activity, onset of puberty, training, partici-
pation in government assistance programs, expectations, time use, criminal
behavior, and alcohol and drug use. This questionnaire also includes ques-
tions about wealth and earnings. Youths are asked many of these asset
questions in the ﬁrst interview after they become independent, turn age 18,
turn age 20, and turn 25 (in Assets 25 section). We will use the information
respondents provide when they turn 25. This is because the share of young
people who are home owners by the age of 20 is too low, and no one from
this survey will have turned 30 by 2009 - in fact, only rounds 2005 until
2009 have individuals aged 25, which reduced our sample to 5150 individu-
als who are either buyers or renters at the age of 25. We also observe the
moment at which youths become independent may have changed with the
crisis, hence the need to compare youths from diﬀerent cohorts at a speciﬁc
age1. This paper will look at the diﬀerences in terms of home ownership and
wealth measures across these diﬀerent cohorts who have turned 25 in diﬀer-
ent years. Wealth measures include the household net worth, house value
and house debt of their primary housing, which may include their parental
home. Table 1 includes summary statistics about some of these measures.
None of these values have been adjusted by inﬂation.
Table 1: Wealth measures of youth who turned 25, nominal average values
Year N Earnings Household House House Financial Nonfinancial Debt
turning 25 Net worth Value Debt Assets Assets
2005 877 24520 34327 34804 21885 10299 26217 11925
2006 1084 26982 37721 44504 29562 13203 26370 12331
2007 1081 27466 32382 36781 24891 12971 24387 14624
2008 1075 27027 30471 30522 21393 12654 23698 13457
2009 1033 28929 29080 32417 26484 12522 23647 12487
Table 1 shows a clear story of how ﬁnancial health changed with the crisis.
In 2006, wealth indicators show a healthy scenario, where the house value
of youths primary housing is much larger than house debt, and both are at
their historical highest. Household ﬁnancial net worth is also considerably
higher than primary house value, showing how most households managed to
1We are not analysing the group of individuals who are still with in their parental home,
despite this being a very interesting research agenda given the pressure on older individuals
to provide for their own pension at the same time as having to continue supporting their
children for longer. Results do show that, as a result of the crisis, the group of 25 year
olds who turned 25 during the crisis increased by almost 10 percentage points.
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accumulate liabilities and wealth coming from their investments. The impact
of the crisis meant that in 2009, house debt has remained high, even if not
as high, but house value shrunk dramatically for 25 year olds of younger
cohorts. What is also alarming is that household net worth also decreased
in 2009 and is barely larger than house debt, which suggests the inability of
ﬁnancial markets to make investments proﬁtable for most youths. This image
becomes somewhat clearer when we look at types of assets and non-housing
debts. The average value of ﬁnancial assets youths have has not decreased
substantially, but potentially their return did. Non ﬁnancial assets on the
other hand seem to have decreased, together with non-housing debt, which
suggests a delay in acquiring durables such as cars for instance. All in all,
youths have less leverage to make investment decisions, specially if they have
invested in housing at this stage in their life.
On the other hand, average earnings seem to be increasing throughout the
period. However, these values conceal distributional considerations, specially
because the proportion of youths who have become buyers at the age of 25,
has also been decreasing since the crisis. As noted earlier, this decrease comes
at the cost of those who have remained with their families. However, only
looking at renters and buyeres, from a maximum of 24.2% of buyers at the
age of 25 in 2006, the share of home buyers decreased to below 20% in 2008
and 2009. The next section will show how the distribution of these variables
has changed over time for buyers and renters separately, and has also changed
between them.
3 Results
Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of earnings buyers and renters at
the age of 25 had in diﬀerent years. Prior to the crisis, the distribution of
earnings of buyers was spreading to the left, which meant more and more
low earners were entering the housing market (part of which constituted
subprime mortgages). This mechanism was so strong that we can actually
observe a bimodality of the earnings curve in Figure 1. In its peak year,
2007, the proportion of these low earners or subprime mortgages was at his
highest. By 2009, this lower second hump of the distribution disappears,
and the curve shifts back to the right. Earners have become richer. At the
same time, part of these buyers who cannot access the housing market are
renting, which is shown by the shift of the earnings curve of renters to the
left in Figure 2. Earnings of renters stopped increasing while the earnings of
buyers became higher, which has bridged a clear divide between these two
groups of youths. This result seems to be conﬁrmed by comparing Figures
8
3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, which track the year-by-year comparison of the earnings
distributions of buyers and renters. In 2005 and 2006, these two curves were
a horizontal shift of each other, where buyers were higehr earners. Inequality
and dispersion increased over this 5 year period for both groups, but the
distribution of renters remains concentrated around a low average value while
the distribution of earnings of buyers spreads to the right.
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Figure 1: Earnings distribution of home owners by age 25
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Figure 2: Earnings distribution of renters by age 25
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Figure 3: Distribution of earnings of young adults who turned 25 in 2005
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Figure 4: Distribution of earnings of young adults who turned 25 in 2006
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Figure 5: Distribution of earnings of young adults who turned 25 in 2007
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Figure 6: Distribution of earnings of young adults who turned 25 in 2008
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Figure 7: Distribution of earnings of young adults who turned 25 in 2009
Wealth measures associated with primary housing are represented in Fig-
ures 8, 9 and 10. The ﬁrst two ﬁgures relate to the household net worth,
assets minus liabilities, of buyers and renters who turned 25 in the diﬀerent
years, whereas Figure 10 shows the distribution of the buyers’ equity. Fig-
ure 8 shows a very clear shift to the left of household net worth for buyers
over the years, which means that younger cohorts of buyers have a lower
buﬀer against shocks to income and wealth. The distribution of household
net worth of buyers has become less dispersed and with a lower mean. On
the other hand, the distribution of household net worth for renters in 9 shows
a very concentrated distribution, much more so than for buyers who can use
their home to increase their liabilities (as long as there is positive equity)
whereas renters cannot. This distribution has however become more dis-
persed in 2007, but has reverted back to the shape it had in 2005. Figure 10
shows how the distribution of home equity has changed between 2005 and
2009 for youths who were buyers at the age of 25 in these diﬀerent years. This
ﬁgure shows that the distribution of home equity has become less dispersed
and has suﬀered a shift to the left so that, even though most home owners at
the age of 25 still have positive home equity2, equity has shrunk. Home buy-
ers, even though wealthier than renters, do not beneﬁt from the large equity
2The estimation method used to estimate these distributions continues the left tail
because of continuity of the kernel used. But the number of actual observations which fall
below zero used to estimate these curves is very small.
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and speculative prices which were common before the crisis. This process
was not gradual however. The most concentrated and to the left curve is
from 2009, but this is followed by the curve from 2007, and only then by
the curve in 2008. This may partly be explained by the positive selection in
2008 of buyers who, from ﬁgure 1, seem to have been much better oﬀ than
their counterparts in 2009. The earnings ﬁgures however refer to earnings
gained in the year prior to the interview, so in eﬀect, the positive selection
happened during the crisis broke out.
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Figure 8: Distribution of household net worth of home owners by age 25
0
.
00
00
1
.
00
00
2
.
00
00
3
.
00
00
4
.
00
00
5
ke
rn
el
 d
en
sit
y
−200000 500000
household net worth of renters at age 25
2005 2006
2007 2008
2009
Figure 9: Distribution of household net worth of renters by age 25
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Figure 10: Distribution of primary housing equity of home owners by age 25
In terms of portfolios of other investments, and given that buyers tend to
be higher earners than renters, it is surprising to observe that while buyers
holdings of other assets increase up to 2008, these have decreased thereafter
whereas for renters, this has not been the case. This is very clearly shown
in Figures 11 and 12 for ﬁnancial assets. For buyers, the distribution of
ﬁnancial assets shows larger holdings for buyers between 2006 and 2008,
and 2009 values become as small as 2005 values (all nominal prices). On
the other hand, and even though buyers do hold more ﬁnancial assets than
renters, the latter has increased their holdings more or less homogeneously
though time, younger cohorts who rent seem to invest a larger share of their
earnings in ﬁnancial assets than older cohorts who rent. This may imply
renters with lower earnings and often not being allowed to enter the housing
market due to low loan-to-value ratios required by ﬁnancial institutions, may
be resorting to high risk / high expected returns in the hope of accumulating
some capital, but more research would be needed to pursue this further. If
it is conﬁrmed, this is a very alarming conclusion given the debility and
instability of ﬁnancial markets at the moment. In terms of non-ﬁnancial
assets, the story told by Figures 13 and 14 is somehow similar, even if not
as clear. While home owners have decreased their holdings of non-ﬁnancial
assets in 2008 and 2009, renters have increased their holdings in this period.
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Figure 11: Distribution of ﬁnancial assets of home owners by age 25
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Figure 12: Distribution of ﬁnancial assets of renters by age 25
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Figure 13: Distribution of non-ﬁnancial assets of home owners by age 25
These results do suggest that buyers may be faring better because they
are higher earners, have larger net worth and positive equity (despite lower
than before the crisis); can use housing as an investment and can expect long
term returns on their project at relatively low risk, while renters are using
stock markets and risky investments to add to their wealth; use housing as
a buﬀer against housing price volatility. Figure 15 shows how rental costs
have changed for 25 year olds who are renting, and it shows yet an additional
constraint on renters who are trying to save and add to their wealth. Rental
costs have increased after the crisis, which adds to the divide of these two
groups. Renters not only have lower earnings, who are decreasing in nominal
terms, than buyers, but they are also faced with higher rents and even lower
income available to save and for consumption. Moreover, uncertainty of the
value of these rents and their inability to resort to the housing market makes
renters very vulnerable to the rental market price which tends to increase
the harder banks make it for young people to access the housing market.
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Figure 14: Distribution of non-ﬁnancial assets of renters by age 25
19
0
.
00
05
.
00
1
.
00
15
ke
rn
el
 d
en
sit
y
0 3000
rental costs at age 25
2005 2006
2007 2008
2009
Figure 15: Rental costs by age 25
Most of the literature in models of home ownership and portfolio choice do
not account for the inﬂuence of changing risk in the choices made by buyers
and renters, and on how selection into home ownership works in these cases.
We have however seen that renters may be resorting to higher risk strategies
to increase their wealth. Figures 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 show how the risk
behaviour of renters and buyers has changed over the period. We use two
measures of risk, the ﬁrst measure represented in these ﬁgures is given by the
ratio of risky (ﬁnancial) assets to safe assets (non-ﬁnancial), which excludes
primary housing. The sequence of these ﬁgures does show that renters, who
traditionally had lower values for this measure, now consume a similar pro-
portion of risky assets, even though their earnings are lower and so his their
ability to protect against negative shocks. Another measure of risk attitude
we used is the debt levels of home owners and of renters. This debt does
exclude housing and is conditioned by borrowing constraints associated with
low earnings. Figures 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 show how debt compares across
time and between the two groups. The distribution of debt for buyers re-
mained more or less similar across cohorts whereas the distribution of renters
was converging to the distribution of buyers and suggesting higher debt lev-
els, but this convergence was broken with the crisis. What these ﬁgures seem
to suggest is that the crisis seems to have prevented, and still is preventing,
renters from smoothing their income through their lifecycle.
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Figure 16: Distribution of the ratio of risky assets of young adults who turned
25 in 2005
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Figure 17: Distribution of the ratio of risky assets of young adults who turned
25 in 2006
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Figure 18: Distribution of the ratio of risky assets of young adults who turned
25 in 2007
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Figure 19: Distribution of the ratio of risky assets of young adults who turned
25 in 2008
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Figure 20: Distribution of the ratio of risky assets of young adults who turned
25 in 2009
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Figure 21: Distribution of debts of young adults who turned 25 in 2005
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Figure 22: Distribution of debts of young adults who turned 25 in 2006
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Figure 23: Distribution of debts of young adults who turned 25 in 2007
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Figure 24: Distribution of debts of young adults who turned 25 in 2008
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Figure 25: Distribution of debts of young adults who turned 25 in 2009
4 Conclusion
This paper tries to analyse empirically the ﬁnancial health of buyers and
renters in the last few years, and whether the ﬁnancial crisis had an impact
on ﬁnancial health. This paper has shown that buyers have become wealth-
ier, and still beneﬁt from positive equity and a relatively safe investment. On
the other hand, renters are faced with higher and unstable rental costs, lower
net worth, lower earnings and seem to be resorting more to riskier portfolios
to increase their wealth. The institutional changes made to protect banks
seem to be weighing more heavily on the most vulnerable group, who cant
buy and is forced to stay in a rental market where equilibrium rental prices
seem to be increasing. This paper hopefully has shown that regulation is
needed also in the housing market, together with a reevaluation of some of
the institutional changes that have been made to banks and loan arrange-
ments, and a reevaluation of ﬁscal and monetary policies to promote home
ownership.
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